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Can Voluntary Racial Integration Plans at the K-
12 Educational Level Meet Grutter's
Constitutional Standard?
CELIA M. RuIz*
More than fifty years after the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, schools and the societies they serve continue
to struggle to desegregate by constitutional means. The 2003 Grutter
decision affirmed that diversity itself can be a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest to survive strict scrutiny, opening new opportunities
for today's schools to achieve desegregation. The First and Ninth Circuits
have relied, en banc, on Grutter to allow K-12 school districts to use race
as a factor in combating continuing racial segregation in elementary and
secondary schools. If courts continue to uphold the use of voluntary racial
integration plans in K-12 schools, the Brown Court's dream of
meaningfully integrated public schools may, finally, become reality in
current students' lifetimes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over fifty years ago, the United States Supreme Court authored a
critically important opinion that profoundly changed American society. In
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court recognized the dramatic
impact that education had come to bear on the lives of individual American
citizens and our society as a whole as the country moved from isolated
farming communities toward industrialization and increasingly diverse
commerce. 1 Brown pronounced that a segregated education in grade and high
schools is inferior to an integrated education and that imposing such an
education on students could impact their "hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone." 2 Brown recognized that public education serves a critical
role both for individual achievement and for society as a whole:
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I Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2 Id. at 494.
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Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to
his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.3
In many ways, the Brown decision encapsulates a vision of public
education that the Court has consistently recognized in a series of decisions.
The Court's vision of public education recognizes the vital government
function it serves in assimilating a diverse and largely immigrant population
and in inculcating fundamental values of citizenship.4 Thus, public education
is at the forefront of society, helping to shape society, rather than just
passively reflecting it.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized education's fundamental role as
the very foundation of good citizenship in the United States.5 Several
decisions regarding public education underscore this critical role, ranging
from the Court upholding a state law requiring that elementary and secondary
teachers be United States citizens, 6 to declaring unconstitutional a state law
denying free public education to undocumented aliens, 7 to recognizing the
close relationship between education and some of our most basic
constitutional values. 8 Each of these decisions rested on public schools'
critical role in preparing students for citizenship in our democratic society. 9
3 1d. at 493.
4 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Swam v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
5 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Swann,
402 U.S. at 15-16; Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
6 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979).
7 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
8 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1973).
9 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76; Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
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A. Grutter v. Bollinger Reaffirmed the Importance of Educational
Diversity
United States Supreme Court decisions involving the role of public
education in our society support yet another overriding factor in Brown:
when young children interact together in a school setting, racial barriers and
stereotypes will be diminished. Without these divisions in the schoolhouse,
voluntary integration in housing and other areas of society will follow. 10 In
large part, these underlying values were affirmed with the Grutter v.
Bollinger decision. Despite the historical difficulties in carrying out the
missives of Brown, the Grutter Court recognized that diversity in the
educational context is a compelling governmental interest in and of itself.I I
Grutter upheld the University of Michigan Law School's admissions process,
which considered race as one factor among many. 1
2
In Grutter, the Court examined overwhelming sociological data from a
variety of sources, including corporations, educational institutions, and the
United States military. These varied entities not only extolled the virtues of
diversity in education, but supported the critical and fundamental need for a
racially diverse student body in educational institutions. 13 Grutter, like
Brown, recognized that integrated education helps to erode racial stereotypes,
advances crossracial understanding, and provides students with the ability to
better understand individuals of different races and backgrounds.
14
Ultimately, integrated education better prepares students to enter the diverse
communities and workplaces we enjoy today. 15 In this manner, the Court
shifted focus from intentional harm or injury to the suspect class to viewing
integrated education as an intrinsically valuable goal to be embraced by and
equally allocated to all. Although Grutter addressed diversity at the graduate
school level, these viewpoints and values are equally, if not more, applicable,
to K-12 schools.
Fortunately, the Grutter decision provides substantial leeway for
continuing to apply limited racial considerations in student assignments.
Moreover, long-standing jurisprudence in education cases opens new
avenues for constitutional arguments within an analysis of K-12 issues.
Judicial precedent has established two critical factors in this analysis. First,
the courts historically grant educational institutions broad deference to make
10 See Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 29 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); see
also Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
1 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003).
12 Id. at 340-41.
13 See id. at 330-31.
14 Id. at 330.
15 Id.
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educational policy decisions, including decisions which relate to the values
that schools wish to promote in their curricula and in their student bodies.' 6
Second, courts have recognized that the key to proper analysis of
constitutional issues in the educational environment is a careful consideration
of the unique context that public schools present, and the many ways this
impacts the policies that are implemented. 17
B. The Applicable Level of Constitutional Review
Notwithstanding the University of Michigan Law School's laudable goal
of achieving diversity, the Supreme Court maintained that good intentions
alone do not carry the bar. 18 Where a state actor is employing highly suspect
means, such as racial classifications, to effectuate its purportedly benevolent
goals, the state must meet the judicial review standard of strict scrutiny. 19 To
survive strict scrutiny, the state actor must demonstrate that consideration of
race serves a compelling governmental interest and that it is narrowly
tailored to use the least restrictive means necessary to further that interest. 20
Within this framework, Grutter opened the door for a whole new era of
cases. By recognizing that racially integrated education could be a
compelling state interest in and of itself, it paved the way for educational
institutions to cease relying on proxies for race and buzzwords for diversity.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District, No. 1,
the Ninth Circuit recently affirmed, en banc, that where an educational
institution determines that racial integration is a legitimate academic and
educational interest, the school district can consider race as arguably the
most accurate marker for that interest. 21 To use alternative means to achieve
racial diversity creates a greater risk of reliance on racial stereotypes. The
First Circuit, en banc, similarly acknowledged the intrinsic educational value
of racially diverse K-12 schools in preparing children for good citizenship.22
While helpful to usher in new constitutional analyses, Grutter's strict
scrutiny analysis may have limited applicability to K-12 schools. The
16 See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-44 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1,42 (1973).
17 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 696 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985).
18 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 326.
21 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1191
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
22 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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Supreme Court employed a somewhat rigid framework in determining
whether the University of Michigan Law School's means were narrowly
tailored. However, it is significant that in analyzing the law school's
admissions policy, the Grutter Court recognized that the context in which the
strict scrutiny test was applied, and the degree to which countervailing
interests were involved, significantly impacted the test's application.
23
The Grutter Court's consideration of context is well-established in
jurisprudence relating to K-12 schools, particularly in the areas of school
desegregation and First and Fourth Amendment issues. As the most stringent
level of review, strict scrutiny has been said to be "'strict' in theory and fatal
in fact."'24 While this may be true in most settings, the Supreme Court has
traditionally scrutinized in a less severe manner when fundamental rights are
involved in the K-12 educational setting.25 The Supreme Court has made it
clear that "the constitutional rights of students in public school are not
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings."
26
Indeed, when addressing fundamental issues involving both the First and
Fourth Amendments, the Court has upheld actions that would have been
struck down outside the school environment.
C. Using Voluntary Integration Plans to Create School Diversity
A highly effective way to achieve racial diversity at the K-12 level
within the confines of strict scrutiny analysis is the use of voluntary
integration plans. The plans rely upon parental choice motivated by
incentives, as opposed to mandatory plans in which students are assigned to
other-race schools without any parental input.2 7 The schools are regular,
nonmagnet specialized schools, where assignments would typically be by
neighborhood attendance boundaries. However, because neighborhoods tend
to be segregated by race and socioeconomic status, a school board can decide
to eliminate geographic boundaries and create alternate assignment
procedures to assure diversity in all its schools. Numerous examples exist of
successfully implemented voluntary integration plans.
28
23 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-28.
24 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
25 In the K-12 educational setting, the Supreme Court has allowed administrators to
infringe on students' Fourth Amendment rights in Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 655-56 and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) and students' First
Amendment rights in Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986).
26 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
27 CHRIsTINE H. RosSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
POLICY 42-43 (1990).
28 Id. at 187.
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As discussed herein, by recognizing the compelling governmental
interest served by achieving racially integrated public schools within the
unique context of the K-12 environment, voluntary integration plans can be
narrowly tailored to satisfy the strict scrutiny test.
II. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY INTEGRATION IN K-12
SCHOOLS
In allowing the law school to consider race in admissions, the Grutter
Court noted that the context in which a policy will be implemented is highly
significant in any strict scrutiny analysis of a race-based government
action.29 Once context is considered as part of strict scrutiny analysis, not
every racially influenced decision will be found equally objectionable.30 This
approach allows for consideration of the challenges and complexities of that
particular setting and how effective the policy will be given those nuances.
Judges can better determine the sincerity behind the government's actions to
address the identified compelling government interest by considering the
context in which the goals are identified and addressed.
The highly unique environment of K-12 schools is a prime example of
why the consideration of context is critical to a strict scrutiny analysis. Not
only are schools forced to make policies within an extensive set of
constraints, but they do so in an attempt to maximize the unique opportunity
they have to further important societal goals and objectives. Chief among
these is equipping students with the tools they need to be good citizens.
This importance was illustrated by two recent en banc U.S. Court of
Appeals cases which upheld the constitutionality of school districts'
desegregation plans using race factors. 3 1 In Comfort v. Lynn School
Committee, the First Circuit upheld a plan which took race into account when
determining a student's ability to transfer out of a neighborhood school. The
Comfort court heeded the Grutter Court's "admonition that '[c]ontext matters
when reviewing race-based governmental action.' ' 32 Similarly, in Parents
Involved, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the importance of context in applying
strict scrutiny to a school district's use of race as a tie-breaker to improve
racial diversity within Seattle public schools.3 3
29 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
30 Id.
31 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 23 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1192-93 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc).
32 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 13 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327).
33 Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1173.
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In reaching these decisions, the First and Ninth Circuits were cognizant
of the backdrop against which each school district created the desegregation
plan: its obligation to prepare students for work and citizenship in an
increasingly ethnically and racially diverse world. 34 Both the Comfort and
Parents Involved courts reasoned that the interests of diversity propounded
by the Grutter Court were equally, if not more, applicable when applied to
K-12 schools. 35 The Comfort decision explains that:
There is no reason to believe that these interests ... are substantially
stronger in the context of higher education than in the context of elementary
and secondary education. In fact, there is significant evidence in the record
that the benefits of a racially diverse school are more compelling at younger
ages. 36
The value of a diverse educational environment identified by the Grutter
Court as a compelling governmental interest is equally applicable to K-12
education, if not more compelling, at these critical and formative grade
levels. The benefits of promoting crossracial understanding and preparing
students for an increasingly diverse workplace and society are even more
impactful at this early stage of a student's development than at the university
level.
Ample sociological research supports the educational policy of actively
integrating classrooms and teaching students to become responsible citizens
in an increasingly diverse society. State legislation nationwide and frequent
judicial precedents reflect these priorities. 37
In order to best capitalize on the unique opportunity that K-12 schools
have to prepare students for citizenship in our multicultural society, it is
imperative that local school administrators be allowed the discretion they
need to formulate a voluntary integration plan which best suits the needs of
their particular school and community.
34 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 14; Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1174-75.
35 See Comfort, 418 F.3d at 6; Parents Involved, 426 F.3d at 1175-76.
36 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 15-16 (citations omitted).
37 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 233.5 (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-208.01 (West
2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.405.030 (West 1997) (establishing a duty to teach,
inter alia, humanity and "true comprehension of the rights, duty and dignity" of
citizenship); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 22-26 (2004),
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf.
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A. Schools Have an Obligation to Teach Students "Good Citizenship"
K-12 education plays a vital and unique role in American society. In
addition to providing the academic preparation and skills necessary to enable
students to pursue gainful employment and access to higher learning, K-12
schools serve the overriding democratic purpose of inculcating basic
democratic values and preparing students for "good citizenship. '38 In fact,
the Grutter Court cited a K-12 case in stressing how the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of education in
preparing students for work and citizenship. 39
Public education's responsibility, at its core, is to impress the
fundamental values of citizenship on the next generation.4° The Supreme
Court has consistently and clearly reaffirmed the principle that public schools
and public school teachers play a unique role in promoting and developing
citizenship. 41 As previously noted, the Supreme Court in Ambach v. Norwick
explained, quoting Brown, that "[the public school is] the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. '42 Even Ambach's
dissenting Justices agreed "that the inculcation of fundamental values by our
public schools is necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system" while rejecting the majority's decision to uphold a state law
requiring U.S. citizenship for K-12 teachers. 43
1. Research Supports the Benefits of a Diverse Educational
Environment
Multiple sociological studies show that participation in integrated
environments is necessary for participation in a diverse, multicultural society
such as ours.44 The Grutter decision cited anicus curiae briefs from both
38 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77; see Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
39 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982)).
40 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 75-76.
41 See generally Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221; Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78; San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 213 (1972); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Pierce v. Soc'y of the
Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
42 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 493).
43 Id. at 86 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 22-26.
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corporate America and the United States military to highlight the concrete
benefits of diversity in education. 45 The Court stated:
These benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking
retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that,
"[b]ased on [their] decades of experience," a "highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its
principle mission to provide national security." 46
Several studies have focused on the positive impact that desegregation
has on students' racial attitudes and social behavior.47 Such research
concludes that both white and nonwhite students in racially diverse schools
are less racially prejudiced than those in other schools. 48 The studies have
also found that an increase in interracial contact among students creates more
interracial sociability and friendship. 49
In particular, a comprehensive study on the recent pattern of school
resegregation examined the long-term benefits of racially and ethnically
diverse schools.50 As part of his research at Harvard University's Civil
Rights Project, Dr. Gary Orfield cited evidence indicating that students who
attended desegregated schools were more likely to lead integrated lives as
adults, in settings such as higher education, housing, and the workplace. 51
Orfield cites research conducted by Amy Wells and Robert Crain who, after
reviewing twenty-one studies, concluded that there is indeed a relationship
between school and workplace segregation. 52 On the whole, Orfield found
that attending heterogenous schools leads "to a greater ability to work with
45 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003).
46 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
47 Jomills H. Braddock & James M. McPartland, Social-Psychological Processes
that Perpetuate Racial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment
Segregation, 19 J. OF BLACK STUD. 267, 285 (1989); Maureen T. Hallinan & Stevens S.
Smith, The Effect of Classroom Composition on Students' Interracial Friendliness, 48
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 3, 13-14 (1985); Amy S. Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation
Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REV. OF EDUC. REs. 531,
552 (1994).
48 Braddock & McPartland, supra note 47, at 285; Hallinan & Smith, supra note 47,
at 13-14; Wells & Crain, supra note 47, at 552.
49 Hallinan & Smith, supra note 47, at 13.
50 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 3-4.
51 Id. at 24.
52 Id. at 24-25.
2006]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
and understand people of backgrounds different than one's own, and to more
fully participate in a rapidly changing democratic society." 53
Desegregation studies generally find that students in racially diverse
schools will have positive attitudes and achieve social ties with students from
other racial groups, provided that the right conditions exist.54 One study
concluded that these conditions include a school climate supportive of cross-
racial and cross-ethnic social interactions and structural and organizational
features of the school that permit and encourage social interactions. 55 In
order to create this atmosphere, it is essential that school districts be allowed
the discretion they need to foster such an environment.
2. State Legislatures Reinforce Teaching Citizenship in Public Schools
Several states mandate that their public schools provide the building
blocks for good citizenship, multicultural awareness, and student preparation
for a global workforce. 56 In addition to traditional academics, California's
Education Code implores teachers to impart their students with "a true
comprehension of the rights, duties, and dignity of American citizenship, and
the meaning of equality and human dignity, including the promotion of
harmonious relations." 57 California's Education Code clearly contemplates a
multicultural educational environment, stating that teachers are "encouraged
to create and foster an environment ... that is free from discriminatory
attitudes, practices, events, or activities, in order to prevent acts of hate
violence." 58
California is not alone in considering citizenship lessons to be a strong
state interest in an educational system. Washington uses similar language in
requiring that teachers instruct students regarding a "true comprehension of
the rights, duty and dignity of American citizenship." 59 Virginia's code also
stresses the importance of its public school curriculum including instruction
regarding civic virtues and basic character traits to improve citizenship and
concern for the common good.60 Colorado goes even further through its state
constitution by requiring' that studies essential to good citizenship be taught
53 Id. at 26.
54 See id. at 24-26.
55 Id.
56 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 233.5 (West 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-208.01 (West
2002); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.405.030 (West 1997).
57 § 233.5.
58 Id.
59 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 28A.405.030 (1997).
60 VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-208.01 (2002).
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in the state's public schools. 61 These laws, as well as those in several other
jurisdictions, illustrate the high priority which state legislatures place upon
teaching students good citizenship.
B. Schools Must Have Discretion to Formulate Voluntary Integration
Plans
Because education is the foundation of citizenship, school districts must
be provided with the discretion to devise programs and student assignment
policies that will prepare students to function as tolerant citizens in a racially
and culturally diverse society. In grappling with these complex educational
issues, Grutter recognized the importance of local control over educational
policy and acknowledged that courts are not the best entity to make these
policies. 62 As a result, Grutter gave broad deference to the judgment of
school administrators. 63 This deference should extend to the educators'
judgment that diversity is of tremendous educational value to students.
1. History of Discretion Granted to School Districts in Desegregation
Litigation
The history of desegregation litigation strongly reinforces judicial
deference to local K-12 administrators' judgment. In upholding substantial
powers of district courts to fashion remedies for school desegregation in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Supreme Court
nevertheless emphasized that "[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged
with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy and might
well conclude, for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to
white students." 64 In so stating, the Court recognized that properly designed
voluntary integration plans can meet the high burden of addressing a
compelling governmental interest. Following Swann, in which illegal racial
segregation was alleged, the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley stated that
"[n]o single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought
essential both to the maintenance of community concern and support for
public schools and to quality of the educational process." 65 The Court further
observed that "local control over the educational process affords citizens an
61 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
62 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
63 Id.
64 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
65 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
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opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the structuring of
school programs to fit local needs, and encourages 'experimentation,
innovation, and a healthy competition for educational excellence.' 66
2. Discretion Granted in Other Education Cases
The Supreme Court's deference to school administrators and local
decision makers has not been limited to desegregation cases. In several other
cases involving education, the Court has been quick to defer to local
judgment and to explain the rationale for doing so.67 In holding that
disparities in school funding do not violate equal protection, the Court
declared that when it comes to the "difficult questions of educational policy
... [the] Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels
against premature interference with the informed judgments made at the state
and local levels."68 Again, in a case addressing the services that a school
must provide for a deaf child, the Court cautioned that the judiciary must be
careful not to impose its "view of preferable educational methods upon the
States." 69
Notably, the circuit and district courts have consistently granted
discretion to local educational agencies. In deferring to a school district's
judgment regarding the appropriate programs for students with limited
proficiency in English, a Northern District of California trial judge, citing a
Fifth Circuit case, warned "that courts should not substitute their educational
values and theories for the educational and political decisions properly
reserved to local school authorities and the expert knowledge of educators,
since they are ill-equipped to do so." 70
Preparing our nation's students to function effectively in the workplace
within the United States' diverse society is such an important goal that it
must be addressed by those entities best equipped to develop and execute an
appropriate plan. This means that school administrators must be free to factor
in the individual needs of their particular schools. K-12 schools should not be
hemmed in by a traditional strict scrutiny analysis which is inapplicable
within this unique context.
Under Grutter and long-standing judicial precedent granting deference to
local control of school districts, K-12 districts should be allowed to devise
66 Id. at 742 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50
(1973)).
67 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26 (1985).
68 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42.
69 Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v.
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207 (1982).
70 Teresa P. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 724 F. Supp. 698, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(citing Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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voluntary integration plans that address racial equity and integration.
Building on their educational expertise and judgment, K-12 schools are
uniquely equipped to provide their students with the skills, both academic
and cultural, necessary to function effectively in a multicultural environment.
III. SPECIAL TREATMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS WITHIN THE
CONTEXT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Special deference to K-12 schools is not limited to substantive
educational rulings. A substantial line of case authority indicates that the
Supreme Court's rulings regarding constitutional issues in schools are greatly
influenced by a consideration of the setting in which the school's actions are
taken.71
A. First Amendment Analysis in Public Schools
Judicial protection of a citizen's First Amendment right to free speech
strikes at the very heart of the United States Constitution. And yet, the
Supreme Court has, in the name of inculcating fundamental values in public
schools, allowed a flexible application of its dictates. 72 While students do not
shed their right to free speech at the schoolhouse gate, a student's right to
express himself or herself is limited by the special characteristics of the
school environment. 73
For example, the Supreme Court ruled that it is constitutionally
permissible for a school to punish a student for indecent speech.74 The Court
reasoned that schools are responsible for inculcating civilized discourse in
students and, therefore, must be allowed to punish profane and indecent
language. 75 The Fraser decision recognized the important role which schools
play in teaching citizenship, noting, "The process of educating our youth for
citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the
civics class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized
social order." 76
The Court's decision also rested on another recurring theme in public
school cases: judicial deference to local educational institutions to make
71 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
72 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
73 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
74 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
75 Id.
76 Id.
2006]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
policy decisions.77 The Court noted that the determination of what manner of
speech is appropriate in the classroom or in a school assembly properly rests
with the school board.78
Ultimately, the Court in Fraser ruled that the First Amendment does not
protect speech in the education setting because even though vulgar or lewd
speech in and of itself may be protected, the context in which it takes place,
(i.e., in school in front of children) militates toward protecting the children
over the rights of the speaker. 79
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis in Public Schools
Similarly, the Supreme Court has not applied traditional Fourth
Amendment review to cases in the K-12 public education setting. In
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court reviewed a decision by the
Ninth Circuit that held unconstitutional a drug testing policy for a high
school athletic program.80 In that case, an Oregon high school had reason to
believe that student athletes were leaders in a school-wide drug culture that
led to an increase in disciplinary problems, vandalism, and suspensions. 81 In
order to curb some of the drug use, the school district implemented a student
athlete drug testing policy. 82 The case was brought by a student who refused
to submit to a drug test, stating that it was a violation of his rights under,
inter alia, the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
searches. 83
In reviewing the Fourth Amendment issue in the school setting, the Court
acknowledged that there was neither a warrant nor probable cause, but stated
that when "special needs" exist, having a warrant or probable cause would be
impracticable. 84 In the example of a public school, special needs exist
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 1d. at 684; see also Virgil v. Sch. Bd., 862 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir. 1989)
(holding that the First Amendment does not prevent a school board from removing a
previously approved textbook from an elective high school class because of objections to
the material's vulgarity and sexual explicitness, and stating that a school board may,
without contravening constitutional limits, take such action when its methods are
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
80 Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
81 Id. at 648-49.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 651. Also, by the time the Supreme Court reviewed this case, it had already
determined that state-compelled collection and testing of urine constituted a search
subject to the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
84 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
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because "'strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based upon
probable cause' would undercut 'the substantial need of teachers and
administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools."' 85
Because the subjects of the drug policy were children who were
"committed to the temporary custody of the State as schoolmaster," 86 the
district was "permitt[ed] a degree of supervision and control that could not be
exercised over free adults." 87 This is not an anomaly in the Court's
jurisprudence. Rather, the Court has clearly created a rule that under the
Fourth Amendment, the K-12 school setting receives a lower level of
scrutiny than do adults or arguably even college students, who may be less
than a year older than their high school counterparts. 88 This difference in
application of the strict scrutiny standard is yet another illustration of the
need to consider the unique K-12 environment in order to arrive at the most
appropriate decision when public school policies are involved.
IV. NARROWLY TAILORED ANALYSIS
Once racial integration in K-12 schools is acknowledged to be a
compelling governmental interest, the courts must determine whether a
particular voluntary integration plan is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest, considered within the applicable context. 89 In order to be found
narrowly tailored, the governmental body has the burden of proving that its
plan is the least restrictive means necessary to further that interest. 90 Grutter
explained that the purpose of this "requirement is to ensure that 'the means
chosen "fit" th[e] compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial
prejudice or stereotype.' 91
Grutter outlined a four-criteria framework to assess whether race-
conscious university admissions programs are narrowly tailored to withstand
strict scrutiny. 92 The program must: (1) consider alternative race-neutral
policies, (2) be limited in duration, (3) not unduly burden individuals who are
85 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
86 Id. at 654.
87 Id. at 655.
88 Id. at 653; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42 (1985).
89 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
90 Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191,
197 (1992).
91 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (alteration in original) (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion)).
92 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
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not members of the favored racial groups, and (4) look at applicants as
individuals rather than create a quota system.93
Because the Supreme Court has never heard a constitutional challenge to
a K-12 voluntary integration plan, it is not known exactly how the Court
would factor context into this particular strict scrutiny analysis. 94 While the
analysis discussed in Grutter does indeed provide a useful framework, the
Court's inquiry in that case was specific to a competitive application process
at the university level.95 As such, the factors were tailored for that
environment.
In order to accurately conduct a constitutional analysis of K-12 schools,
the Grutter narrowly tailored factors must be customized and adapted to fit
this unique context. As recently stated by the First Circuit in Comfort and the
Ninth Circuit in Parents Involved, the narrow tailoring inquiry is inherently a
context-specific analysis which "must be 'calibrated to fit the distinct issues
raised' in a given case, taking 'relevant differences into account.' 96
A. Alternative Means
Under Grutter, for an integration plan to be considered narrowly tailored,
the school must first give sufficient consideration to racially-neutral
alternatives.97 The test involves a good faith examination of workable
alternatives but does not require a school to exhaust every conceivable race-
neutral option.98 In Grutter, the Court rejected the idea of forcing the law
school to further consider a lottery system or to decrease academic standards
as race-neutral ways of achieving its goal of a diverse student body.99 Such
alternatives, the Court noted, "would require the Law School to become a
much different institution" and would preclude it from conducting the
individualized assessments necessary to assemble a student body that is in
line with all the qualities valued by the university. 100 In so doing, the Court
continued the judicial tradition of granting deference to educational
institutions for policy-related decisions.
While racially neutral policies may be a suitable consideration for law
school admissions, they are not an appropriate policy within the context of
93 Id. at 342.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 16 (lst Cir. 2005) (en banc); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1180 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc).
97 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
98 Id. at 339.
99 Id. at 340.
100 Id.
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K-12 voluntary integration plans. Relying solely on racially neutral policies
has simply not proven successful in preventing racial segregation in the K-12
arena. Realistically, race must be taken into account in order to address this
compelling government interest. The goal is in fact racial diversity, and not
viewpoint or subject matter diversity, as may be the case in other
constitutional challenges. Consideration of alternative means may remain a
component of the narrowly tailored analysis. It is also essential to realize,
however, that such alternatives may never adequately lead the district to
achieve the ultimate goal of racial diversity.
The circuit courts are beginning to address this reality. The Comfort case
provided a narrowly tailored analysis that acknowledged that K-12 diversity
policies need not consider racially neutral alternatives. 10 1 In that case, the
First Circuit saw "no reason to impose a blanket prohibition on the use of
race as a decisive factor in a student transfer plan to further a compelling
interest in obtaining the educational benefits of racial diversity.' 0 2 As such,
the First Circuit both acknowledged that attaining racial diversity is a
compelling government interest, and permitted the direct use of race to
further this goal.103
Similarly, in Parents Involved, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that both
promoting racial diversity to improve the quality of education and avoiding
replicating housing segregation in schools are compelling state interests in
their own right.10 4 To attain these compelling goals, the court allowed a
school district to use race as a tie-breaking factor in student assignments.
10 5
Of the Seattle schools' use of race to improve racial integration, the court
wisely noted, 'The logic is self-evident: When racial diversity is a principal
element of the school district's compelling interest, then a narrowly tailored
plan may explicitly take race into account."106 In response to the dissent's
claim that "[t]he way to end discrimination is to stop discriminating by race,"
the Ninth Circuit majority plainly observed, "More properly stated, the way
to end segregation is to stop separation of the races. The Seattle school
district is attempting to do precisely that."' 0 7
101 Comfort, 418 F.3d at 12.
102 Id. at 19.
103 Id.
104 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1179
(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
105 Id. at 1191, 1193.
106 Id. at 1191.
107 Id. at 1191 n.34.
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1. Inefficacy of Using Non-Racial Criteria: The Resegregation of K-12
Schools
Concrete examples illustrate school districts' failures to achieve racial
diversity using racially neutral proxies or alternative yardsticks. San
Francisco Unified School District implemented a court-ordered diversity plan
in 2001 which mandated that the district eliminate racial and ethnic
segregation. The district was charged "to achieve the broadest practicable
distribution throughout the system of students from the racial and ethnic
groups which comprise the enrollment."' 10 8 Despite the court's obvious goal
of creating racially diverse schools, the order prohibited the district from
using race as a factor in student placement. 109 Instead, the district was forced
to rely upon factors such as academic achievement scores, parents'
educational background, language proficiency, home language, and the
ranking of a student's previous school. 110 As a result, an independent review
conducted in 2003 revealed that student assignment in San Francisco was not
achieving the racial diversity contemplated by the court's order. "'
Instead, one year into the new assignment plan, thirty-four schools were
severely resegregated at one or more grade levels, meaning that the school's
population consisted of 60% or more of one race or ethnicity. 112 The
independent reviewing committee sympathized with the district's ironic
position: it was ordered to desegregate its schools but denied the logical use
of race in developing a diversity plan to do so.113 As a result of these
artificial constraints, the school populations became "diverse" by the
standards measured by the index, but were severely segregated when
measured by race.
The grim reality of the current situation in K-12 education is that the
gains made after the pronouncement of Brown v. Board of Education have
been quickly eroding. The rapid resegregation of our nation's schools by race
and socioeconomic status has been documented by various researchers. Most
prominently, Dr. Gary Orfield's comprehensive study reveals that the nation
has been headed toward increased segregation for black students over the
past decade. The study also revealed that for Latinos, the largest group of
minority students, segregation has been steadily increasing, in part because
108 STUART BIEGEL, SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT DESEGREGATION:
PARAGRAPH 44 INDEP. REv. REP. No. 20 2002-2003 3-4 (July 31, 2003),
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/edlaw/sfrept20.pdf.
19Id. at5.
110 San Francisco Unified School District Public School Enrollment Fair, 1,
http://portal.sfusd.edu/data/epc/DILottery.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2006).
111 BIEGEL, supra note 108, at 4.
112 Id.
1131Id.
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there has never been any significant enforcement of school desegregation for
Latinos.114
The grave concern over this trend toward resegregation is appropriate.
Numerous courts and commentators recognize that education in racially
isolated schools is qualitatively inferior to that of an integrated education.
11 5
Dr. Orfield notes that "the vast majority of intensely segregated minority
schools face conditions of concentrated poverty, which are powerfully
related to unequal educational opportunity." 116 Moreover, in racially
segregated schools, unequal distribution of resources continues.117 In
addition, national statistics reveal that only a small fraction of
underrepresented minorities are graduating from high school with the
necessary preparation to go to college. 118
Just as the Grutter Court deferred to educators in determining whether
race-neutral alternatives were effective and which alternatives to consider, so
too should a similar rationale be applied in the K-12 context with race being
considered only after other student assignment mechanisms have failed to
achieve a "critical mass" of underrepresented minorities. Geographic zones
or alternative remedies suggested by the judiciary are merely subterfuges for
race. 119 It simply does not make sense to sanction indirect consideration over
direct consideration of race.
Due to the unique K-12 environment, race must be factored into any
diversity plan. Looking at students' other characteristics will not solve the
problem of racial segregation. To effectively implement a voluntary
integration plan, K-12 school districts must consider race at the outset. Thus,
the other Grutter elements of flexibility, burden on third parties, and duration
should be the primary factors in assessing whether a voluntary integration
plan is narrowly tailored.
114 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 3.
115 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971);
Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Beth A. Young &
Thomas M. Smith, The Social Context of Education, in THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION
1997 2, 11 (Rebecca Pratt ed., 1997),
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps2522/1997/97388.pdf; Catherine Freeman, Benjamin
Scafidi & David Sjoquist, Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools 1994-2001:
Trends, Causes and Impact on Teacher Quality, at 30 (Fiscal Res. Program, Rep. No. 78,
Dec. 2002), http://frp.aysps.gsu.edu/frp/frpreports/Report_77/Rpt77text.pdf.
116 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 3.
117 Id.
119 Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123, 134 (4th Cir. 1999)
(holding that although the county considered multiple factors in evaluating a student's
transfer request, the county's conduct was unconstitutional, as the transfer was denied
because of the student's race).
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B. Flexibility
In terms of flexibility, the Grutter Court emphasized that applicants must
be looked at as individuals, rather than grouped together on the basis of
classifications such as race or ethnicity. 120 Similarly, in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that race-
conscious admissions programs could not create a system of quotas in which
minorities compete against one another for a certain number of admissions
slots. 121 However, the Court still recognized that attaining a diverse student
body is a substantial state interest. 122 The Bakke Court held that race could be
considered in admissions so long as it was only considered a "plus" in a
particular applicant's file. 123 In Grutter, the University of Michigan Law
School's admissions policy withstood the flexibility criterion because it
considered all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular
qualifications of each applicant.' 24
While such an analysis may be appropriate in the competitive university
application process in which there are far more applicants than there are
spaces available, individualized assessment is not applicable in the K-12
context, as a public education is available to everyone. The fact that no one is
denied a free, public K-12 education lessens the need for individualized
review of students in a voluntary integration plan. This is particularly true
because schools are theoretically homogeneous, especially within districts
that are fairly well standardized. In addition, given that schools are now
subject to similar standards, such as those created by the No Child Left
Behind Act, which seeks to create uniform curricula and achievement
measurements, waiver and hardship are sufficient ways to provide
flexibility. 125 Such mechanisms can be easily incorporated into a voluntary
integration plan to allow students and their parents the input they need to
ensure that racial considerations are able to exist harmoniously with the
flexibility to look at other narrowly tailored factors.
C. Burden to Third Parties
Most importantly, the Grutter test for narrowly tailored plans requires
that a race-conscious admissions program not "unduly burden" individuals
120 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003).
121 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
122 Id. at 320.
123 Id. at 317.
124 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
125 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. H 2002).
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who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups. 126 The Grutter
Court was satisfied that the law school's policy did not unduly burden
nonminority students because the policy considered "all pertinent elements of
diversity," not just race, as a plus factor. 127
Within the context of K-12 schools, the consideration of burden to third
parties takes on an entirely different interpretation. Because the system-wide
goal of an enhanced educational experience is served by diversity, all
students benefit by an assignment which ensures that schools have a "critical
mass" of racial and ethnic groups represented in a district. 128 Also, because
assignment mechanisms are uniformly applied to all students in voluntary
integration plans, this is not a situation of discriminatory or preferential
treatment for any particular race or student. Unlike in universities, there is no
scarce resource being allocated by assignment within K-12 schools.
The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed that every student is entitled to
receive a high school education that meets state standards, but is not entitled
to attend a specific school. 129 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District, No. 1, parents challenged the consideration of race in
an assignment plan for "oversubscribed" high schools. The court noted that
"it is undisputed that the race-based tiebreaker does not uniformly benefit
one race or group to the detriment of another." 130 The court concluded that
the use of race in determining student assignment does not unduly harm any
student in the district.131 In fact, even the parents who brought suit against
the district acknowledged that all students benefit from increased contact
with children of other races. 132
D. Duration
The fourth criterion is that race-conscious admissions be limited in time
so as not to offend the fundamental principle of equal protection. 133 The
Grutter Court reasoned that although there may still be a compelling state
interest in diversifying universities, racial classifications are potentially so
dangerous that they cannot be employed more broadly than the interest
126 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
127 Id.
128 Hallinan & Smith, supra note 47, at 3-16.
129 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1191
(9th Cir. 2005).
13Old. at 1192.
131 Id.
132 td.133 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
2006]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
demands. 134 The Court suggested periodic reviews and a sunset date of
twenty-five years to end the use of racial preferences in higher education. 135
The interests pronounced and the legal analysis supporting Grutter
extend beyond higher education and beyond an arbitrary limitation of time
when applied to K-12 education. However appropriate this sunset provision
may be for law school admissions procedures, this timeline fails to
adequately account for this country's long-standing history of racial
segregation and disparity, the deficiencies of integrated settings in social and
housing environments, and the complicated backdrop of the Brown progeny.
In order for K-12 schools to properly prepare students to live in a
democracy free from racial bias and discrimination, the underlying policy
implication of Grutter must be expanded rather than constricted. If the goal
of racially integrated public education is to be achieved and maintained,
twenty-five years is simply not sufficient, absent remarkable, unprecedented
societal change. Rapid resegregation is currently denying equal opportunities
to students and is widening the chasm between those who are prepared for a
college education and those who are not. 136 The No Child Left Behind Act is
actually documenting the drastic inequalities between "successful" schools
and those schools identified as "failing."' 137 All too frequently, the "failing"
schools are the same schools that are racially segregated. 138
Further, schools need more time to achieve racial diversity because our
courts have not yet begun to fully address the types of segregation occurring
nationwide. The 1954 Brown decision attempted to reverse the damaging
effects of segregation of black Americans in the South. 139 Fifty-plus years
later, studies show that any steps taken toward the goal of integrating black
students into racially diverse schools are now being reversed amidst a trend
of resegregation. 140 What then does this mean for the integration of Latino
students, about whom the Supreme Court said nothing until nineteen years
after Brown and for whom there has never been a significant desegregation
enforcement?141
Unlike remedial contexts, in which restorative acts must have a definite
termination point after the victim has been returned to the position she would
have occupied absent the discrimination, a nonremedial justification needs to
be continued as long as necessary to further that interest. Duration is thus
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 9.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
140 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 37, at 2.
141 Id.
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fundamentally intertwined with the educational policy decisions regarding
the desire for an integrated educational environment. Due to the tremendous
influence of geographic factors and housing patterns, it is not clear that
school districts can set fixed deadlines. Therefore, plans that promote K-12
diversity may be necessary for a period that exceeds any timeline set for
higher education institutions. While K-12 districts should monitor housing
patterns and other data to determine whether continued consideration of race
is necessary, integration plans must be created with an acceptance of the
reality that K- 12 racial diversity is a long way from being fully realized.
V. CONCLUSION
In the five decades since Brown v. Board of Education heralded an era of
desegregation and racial integration in our nation's public schools, much
progress remains to right the wrongs of de jure and de facto segregation.
Sociological data indicate an alarming trend of resegregation in certain areas,
and true racial integration remains a distant goal for many school districts.
In its Grutter decision, the Supreme Court opened the possibility for K-
12 schools to survive strict scrutiny while still using critically relevant race
as a factor in promoting racial integration. The Grutter Court affirmed that
students benefit from racially integrated education in a higher education
context and that race may be used if the means are narrowly tailored to the
important goal. In so doing, the Court invited K-12 schools to assert and
defend their own compelling interests in promoting racial diversity as an
educational foundation for good citizenship in an increasingly diverse nation
and world.
The First and Ninth Circuits, each sitting en banc, have recently
responded to this opportunity by upholding two districts' use of race as a
factor to achieve racial diversity in K-12 schools. By modifying the Grutter
analysis to the elementary and secondary school context, the Comfort and
Parents Involved courts affirmed that racial integration and diversity are
compelling state interests. The courts allowed the districts to use race itself to
achieve these important goals, provided that the means fit the general
narrowly tailored criteria propounded in Grutter.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence counsels particular deference to
school administrations in identifying educational goals, and the means to
reach them. History shows that the twenty-five year goal espoused by the
Supreme Court may not be sufficient time to transition to a total "color
blind" system, given that ten years after Brown, schools in the South were
not even remotely integrated, and fifty years after Brown, the debate over
similar racial issues and racial disparities and the best methodology for
ensuring fairness still remains. However, these issues and this debate are
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even more important for K-12 students because these are the critical
formative years for students who are shaping the future.
